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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
EDITH N. GARDNER, 
Plaintiff, Respondent 
vs. 
E.A.RL W. GARDNER, 
Defendant, Appellant 
RESPONDENT'S 
Case No. 7342 
BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This state1nent of facts is ·given not merely as a 
contradiction, but for a more complete understanding of 
the material facts omitted in appellant's brief. The 
respondent and appellant inter-married, at Pocatello, 
Idaho, on June 15, 1948, ( R. 38) and they returned to 
Logan, and resided with respondent's mother, Rebecca 
Yonk. (R. 38). The respondent had lived in Logan for 
about 2 years continuously prior to date of filing suii 
for divorce against the appellant. (R. 37). Both parties 
had been married before, ( R. 40, 41, 51, 153) the plaintiff 
had one married daughter residing in Salt Lake City, (R. 
40, 41) and a married son residing at San Rafael, Cali-
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fornia. (R. 51). Appellant also had children by prior 
marriage. ( R. 153). 
When appellant married the respondent he had no 
home; (R. 43, 64) but owned a Chrysler car and an 
equity in a farm at Santaquinn, Utah, which was leased 
during the year, 1948, and the tenant was residing on the 
property. (R. 43, 44). About September 23, 1948, de-
fendant sold his equity in the farm. From the date of 
their marriage to the date this action was commenced, 
the appellant was un-employed, (R. 47), and spent a 
portion of the time at Logan with respondent and the 
other portion away from Logan, just where, plainti£1! 
was not always informed .. (R. 47). Frequently he got 
in his car and left, without informing respondent where 
he was going or when he would return. (R. 56). He 
came and went as he pleased and lived a life of apparent 
leisure. (R. 47). While in Logan, he lived with re-
spondent at her mother's home, but bought no groceries 
for the table. (R. 56). In fact, shortly prior to the 
marriage, appellant borrowed $300.00 from respondent, 
which had not been repaid at the time this action wa~ 
commenced. (R. 59). In November, and after the com-
mencement of this action, he sent her $50.00 to meet him 
in Reno, but she declined to go and credited this money 
to the foresaid loan. (R. 59). 
The plaintiff testified that defendant was of a jeal-
ous and ill tempered disposition. (R. 38, 46). These 
parties had only been rnarried about two weeks when 
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appellant, returning to Logan from one of his out of 
town trips, learned that the respondent had gone to the 
cemetery with a niece to decorate a grave and respon-
dent had only been absent about fifteen minutes when 
the appellant arrived home. (R. 38). He thereupon be-
came angry and registered at a Logan hotel. The re-
spondent, upon returning home, learned that appellant 
had been there and expecting that he would return mo-
mentarily, prepared dinner and waited for appellant 
until 7 o'clock p. m., when he phoned her from the hotel. 
(R. 39). Respondent told him that dinner was read.v 
and invited him to come home, but he refused and re-
mained in the hotel for two days before he returned. 
(R. 40). 
There were several major quarrels thereafter as the 
record will show. About July 17, when the appellant 
had been away from Logan for several days, the re-
spondent accompanied a lady friend to Salt Lake City, 
and upon their arrival at the home of respondent's 
daughter, the appellant came there shortly thereafter in 
a very angry mood and caused quite a scene, (R. 41-44) 
and upon that occasion, the appellant threatened the 
respondent with divorce, and took her to his lawyer's 
office for that purpose. (R. 43). But his lawyer was 
busy and they were therefore unable to see him and 
appellant suggested to respondent that they drive to 
Beaver, Utah, which they did and remained two days. 
Upon their return from Beaver, and when arriving near 
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Salt Lake City, a dispute arose between them as to 
whether or not they should remain in Salt Lake City that 
night, or drive on to Logan. ( R. 45). 
The testimony also shows that the defendant was 
very discourteous and unfriendly with plaintiff's lady 
friends and also toward members of her family. The 
fact that appellant refused to greet respondent's friends 
and relatives, or be courteous to them, naturally hurt 
and humHiated her, and it created a strained atmosphere 
which resulted in her friends remaining away from her 
home. (R. 56, 57). When respondent remonstrated with 
appellant to discontinue his discourteous treatment to-
ward her friends and relatives, he refused to change. (R. 
57). 
While it is not possible to enumerate all the quarrels 
had between the parties during the time that they lived 
together, as respondent testified that she could not recall 
all of them. (R. 56). But she summarized as follows: 
"Well, it seems like we quarreled every time we met, as 
nearly as I remember. Whether I went to Salt Lake, or 
he came to Logan, we nearly always had a quarrel. I 
didn't say all the time, but nearly everytime we met, it 
ended up in a quarrel. If it didn't start that way it 
ended up that way. We just didn't get along. (R. 48). 
The appellant had no home to take the respondent 
to, (R. 64) between the date of marriage (June 15) and 
the date they left on the trip to California (September 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
25), appellant made no attempt to provide a home for 
respondent. ( R. 64). 
The appellant, respondent, and the latter's mother 
left for California on September 25. (R. 48). With re-
spect to purpose of the California trip, respondent testi-
fied: ''Well, we sort of was going on a trip and look for 
a place at the same time. If things went well that was 
our intentions, but they didn't go well.". (R. 48). They 
arrived in California the latter part of September, and 
ren1ained there until October 14, (R. 51) and while there 
they lived with respondent's son. (R. 51). The parties 
purchased a home, but did not occupy it. (R. 49-50). 
They opened a bank account in the Bank of America at 
San Rafael. Respondent deposited $1400.00, of her 
savings, and appellant deposited $4000.00, which he re-
ceived from sale of farm property. (R. 50). They made 
a partial payment of $1400.00 on purchase price and 
agreed to pay the balance thereof in monthly payments. 
(R. 51). After the initial payment was made and prior 
to their leaving California, the appellant withdrew 
$3000.00, from said bank account by means of a cashier's 
check and carried the check back to Utah with him, which 
he did without respondent's knowledge. (R. 172). 
After several heated quarrels between these parties 
during the latter portion of their sojourn in California, 
which were provoked by appellant, (R. 51, 52, 85) he said 
-"this is the finish, I'm going back to Utah." (R. 52). 
So they immediately thereafter left for Logan, (R. 52, 
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53) and when they arrived there on October 16, appel-
lant,"unloaded all his things and was going to hunt 
deer.'' He immediately left Logan for the deer hunt in 
the vicinity of Wasatch County and was absent about 
two weeks before he returned. (R. 53, 54). In the mean-
time, respondent had commenced her action for divorce 
(October 28). (R. 3, 53). These parties did not 
cohabit together· as man and wife after the last quarrel 
in California. 
The respondent testified that appellant frequently 
provoked quarrels without provocation, and she couldn't 
see any reason for an argument on many of the oc-
casions when he suddenly and unexpectedly started one. 
(R. 53). Respondent also testified that as a result of 
appellant's conduct she became "nervous and upset and 
was not at ease around him." (R. 53). Prior to her 
marriage, respondent enjoyed good health but after liv-
ing with appellant from June 15, to October 16, she be-
came very nervous and miserable and lost weight. (R. 
54, 55). 
ARGUMENT 
Point l-The District Court had jurisdiction to enter 
aecree of divorce. 
Appellant questions the jurisdiction of the lower 
court to enter a decree of divorce because it is contended 
that respondent was not a bona-fide resident of the State 
of Utah, and County of Cache for a period of three 
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n1onths prior to the co1n1nencement of the action. 
This contention is predicated upon these proposi-
tions; viz.,-Appellant owned property in Santaquinn, 
Dtah, prior to marriage; and his ownership in the san1e 
continued until September 23, 1948; and he had a place 
to live on property even though the home thereon was 
occupied by a tenant. 
The foregoing propositions may be conceded, yet they 
do not sustain appellant's contention that plaintiff was 
not a boni-fide resident of Cache County, Utah, for more 
than three months prior to the 28th day of October, 1948, 
when this action was commenced. The evidence is undis-
puted that the respondent was residing with her mother 
in Logan at the time of this marriage. (R. 37). The 
parties were Inarried in Pocatello, Idaho, and immed-
iately returned to Logan, where the respondent con-
tinued to resume her residence with her mother, and ap-
pellant took up his residence at the same place. The 
fact that the appellant had an equity in a farm at Santa-
quinn does not conclusively prove that the appellant 
lived there. There is no evidence that the appellant 
owned any household furniture. None is mentioned in 
the record. Neither is there any evidence, and appellant 
does not claim, that he provided a home for the respon-
dent at Santaquinn. From the evidence, it is fairly de-
ducible that the appellant, being unemployed, was con-
tent to live with the respondent in the home furnished by 
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her mother at Logan. Respondent's brother, Alfred 
Yonk, also testified that respondent had been a resident 
of Cache County for more than three months prior to 
commencement of divorce action. (R. 109). 
The foregoing testimony definitely shows that re-
spondent was an actual boni-fide resident of the County 
of Cache and State of Utah, for more than three months 
prior to October 28, 1948, when this action was com-
menced, and the appellant's testimony does not dispute 
the fact that he and respondent made their home with 
plaintiff's mother in Logan, from the date of their mar-
riage. There is absolutely no evidence to prove that 
these parties resided elsewhere. But counsel contends 
that assuming that these parties were boni-fide residents 
of Cache County, Utah, after their marriage on June 15. 
yet they took up a new residence in the State of Cali-
fornia about September 28, when they took a trip there. 
With respect to their intentions, respondent testified: 
"Well, we sort of was going on a trip and look for a 
place at the same time. If things went well that was our 
intentions, but they didn't go well." (R. 48). Conceding 
for the sake of argument that when the parties left 
Logan on this trip they entertained some intentions of 
making their home in California, (R. 48) however, the 
undisputed evidence shows that while they were there, 
about 16 days, they lived as house guests at the home of 
respondent's son. (R. 51). rrhey purchased a home, but 
they did not occupy it, and before the time for occupancy 
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arrived, they had returned to Logan on account 
of having had several heated quarrels, and after 
the last one, the respondent testified that appellant said 
-''This is the finish. This is enough.'' ( R. 89). And 
on the appellant's cross examination, he admitted, (R. 
151) that what occurred between respondent and appel-
lant in California was of such grave magnitude that it 
disrupted their plan to stay in California, and that as a 
result thereof they came back to Logan, (R. 151, 152). 
And appellant then left the respondent in Logan, at her 
place of residence and went ''deer hunting,'' and did not 
return until October 30th, two days after the divorce 
action had been filed. (R. 3). It thus definitely appears 
from the evidence, that the California trip resulted in a 
complete failure to establish a residence there. (R. 89, 
151, 152). And the California trip also had the effect 
of terminating their marital relationship, as the appel-
lant admitted after the last quarrel there, that it was 
"the finish," between them. ( R. 89, 151, 152). How 
then can appellant contend that the parties established a 
residence in California 1 
It is contended on page 6 of appellant's. brief that he 
considered himself domiciled in Santaquinn. The record 
is absolutely void of any fact to support this conclusion, 
in fact there is no evidence in the record that appellant 
ever stayed overnight on the farm at Santaquinn. So 
that the reasons stated on page 6 of appellant's brief are 
mere conclusions and are not based upon any facts. 
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The case of Kidman v. Kid1nan, 164 P. 2d, 201, is cited 
by appellant, but that case is not authority for appel-
lant's contention. In that case the plaintiff's residence 
for the statutory period was admitted by the defendant. 
Respondent respectfully subn1its that the rule re-
ferred to in Section 31, Vol. 17, Am. J ur. page 609, is not 
in point with the facts in the instant case. These parties 
had not moved into a home in the State of California. 
On October 14, when they left California, they had not 
established a residence there. 
The fact that appellant went back to California after 
the divorce action was commenced, is immaterial because 
it occurred after the Court acquired jurisdiction. The 
fact that appellant made some improvements on the 
house in California was undoubtedly done to finish it for 
resale purposes. This is evidenced by the fact that after 
appellant went to California in November, and after this 
action was commenced, he listed the property for sale or 
for rent. (R. 180-182). 
On page 8 of appellant's brief counsel says: 
"The fact that Mr. Gardner regarded Cali-
fornia his home is further borne out by the fact 
that after the California h01ne became vacant he 
entered into it and made extensive repairs and he 
remodeled the place. He got it ready for his wife 
and requested that she come and live at their 
home. However, in the meantime, she had re-
turned to Logan, and after being in Utah for the 
short period of twelve days, she commenced 
divorce proceedings.'' 
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It is respectfully sub1nitted that the foregoing state~ 
1nent is diametrically opposed to the undisputed evi-
dence. The appellant testified that they returned to Lo-
gan from California on October 14th. (R. 152). He then 
went deer hunting in the vicinity of Wa~atch County. (R. 
154), and spent from October 16-28 deer hunting, (R. 
153). Appellant then returned to Salt Lake City and 
remained there until October 30th, when he came to 
Logan. ( R. 154). This action was commenced on 
October 28th, (R. 3) and the summons was served upon 
appellant on October 29th, (R. 4). It thus definitely ap-
pears that appellant remained in Utah until after the 
action was commenced. In fact, appellant testified that 
he left Salt Lake for California on Sunday afternoon, 
October 31st, (R. 158) and that he made the repairs on 
the home after returning to California, and after the 
divorce action was commenced. (R. 161-164). 
The Utah case of Grant v. Lawrence, 108 Pac. 931 is 
cited by appellant on page 9 of his brief. While that 
case is distinguishable on the facts from the case at bar, 
yet the rule is stated (2nd head note) that a man's place 
oi residence is a question of fact and not of law. When 
that rule is applied to the facts in the case at bar, it will 
be seen that plaintiff was a boni-fide resident of Cache 
County, and State of Utah, for more than three months 
prior to October 28th, when this action was commenced. 
Counsel also cites the Arizona case of Sneed v. Sneed, 
123 Pac. 312. This case is also authority for respon-
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dent's contention that th~ parties did not establish a 
residence in California. In defining ''an actual boni-fide 
resident,'' the Arizona Court said: 
''We conclude that ' an actual boni-fide resi-
dent' means a person who is in Arizona to reside 
permanently, and who, at least for the time being, 
entertains no idea of having or seeking a perm-
anent home elsewhere.'' 
When the foregoing definition is applied to the facts 
in the instant case, it will be seen that these parties did 
not become actual boni-fide residents of California, dur-
ing their brief and temporary so-journ there between 
September 27, and October 14. 
Point No. II-Court had discretionary power to 
award plaintiff attorneys fees. 
Counsel contends ·that it was abuse of discretion to 
award attorneys fees in the absence of allegations, a 
prayer, or any proof concerning such fees. 
This court held in the case of Anderson v. Anderson, 
181 Pac. 168, cited by appellant, that the wife, plaintiff in 
that action, was entitled to attorney's fees, under the 
statute as well as at common law. In so holding, this 
court said: 
"There is absolutely no merit in the conten-
tion made that the plaintiff is not entitled to the 
attorney fee allowed her by the trial court. We 
thin:K the trial court was empowered to make the 
order concerning attorney's fees under C01np. 
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Laws 1917, Sections 2998, 3010, and 3011, either 
before or at the conclusion of the trial. Inde-
pendent of statute, under the rules of the com-
mon la\v, the plaintiff was entitled to employ 
counsel and render the defendant liable to pay 
for the services rendered by him in her suit.'' 
The other Utah case cited by appellant on page 10 of 
his brief, Jenkins v. Jenkins, 153 P. 2d. 262, is not 
authority for his contention, because that case was an 
annulment suit. They were not legally married, there-
fore, she had no legal claim upon the defendant for sup-
port. 
Other Utah cases holding that the allowance of suit 
money or attorney fees is largely a matter within the 
sound discretion of the trial court are : Burtt v. Burtt, 
59 Utah 457, 204 P. 91; Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 Utah 
9, 12 P. 2nd. 364; Weiss v. Weiss, 179 P. 2d. 1005. 
There is probably no rule more uniformly established 
by the Courts of the several states than the rule giving 
the trial court the power to grant the wife attorney's 
fees. In some recent cases so holding from other states 
are Zook v Zook (Colo.) 195 P. 2d. 287 ; Holly v Holly 
(Kan.) 188 P. 2d. 650; Fallon v. Fallon (Cal. App.) 189 
P. 2d. 766; Walker v. Walker (Tex. Civ. App.) 201 S. W. 
2d. 261. This rule is also laid down in 19 C. J. 228, Sec. 
545, in the following language: 
"The allowance of suit money and counseJ 
fees to a wife, and the amount thereof, as in the 
case of an allowance of temporary alimony, is 
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largely within the discretion of the trial court, 
to be exercised in view of the conditions and cir-
cumstances of the case, and it will not be dis-
turbed on appeal unless this discretion has been 
abused.'' (Italics added). 
In paragraph "d" of the prayer of plaintiff's 
amended complaint, she prayed for equitable relief, and 
this prayer invoked the equitable powers of the Court. 
Appellant further contends that there was no proof 
on which to base an award of attorney's fees. This Court 
held in the Anderson case, supra, that the trial court 
could make an award for attorney's fees without taking 
testimony to support the same, and in so holding said : 
''So, too, the trial court had the right to con-
sult his own experience and knowledge, without 
taking testimony, as to what was reasonable in 
the particular case. Peyre v. Peyre, 79 Cal. 336, 
21 Pac. 838." 
Point III-The findings, conclusions and decree are 
supported by competent as well as by a preponderance 
of the evidence. 
The appellant's contention (Point III) that the evi-
dence adduced does not support the findings, conclusions 
and decree, has been answered largely under respon-
dent's discussion of the evidence under Point I herein. 
The record is replete with evidence showing appel-
lant's irregular and malicious conduct, which provoked 
trouble and quarrels between these parties. Probably 
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the principal reason why appellant exhibited the quarrel-
sonle attitude and disposition toward respondent as 
shown by the evidence resulted from his unemployment 
and idleness. For that reason, he may have had an in-
feriority complex, and in order to show his importance 
and authority he felt it necessary to provoke frequent 
quarrels with respondent. 
Counsel for appellant, on pages 11 and 13 of his brief, 
cites three Utah cases, Ahlborn v. Ahlborn, 204 P. 99; 
Hartwell v. Hartwell, 69 P. 265; and Cawley v. Cawley, 
202 P. 10, as authority for his contention that if both 
parties to the action are guilty of misconduct, neither 
party is entitled to a divorce. When the facts in those 
cases are examined, it will be seen that they are clearly 
distinguishable from the case at bar. In all those cases 
the trial court denied plaintiff a divorce and dismissed 
the action. 
While in the case at bar, the trial court granted the 
plaintiff a divorce based upon competent evidence. The 
lower court heard the testimony and observed the de·-
meanor of the wisnesses. He was in a position to weigh 
and consider the testimony, and the plaintiff's testimony 
is corroborated in many material respects by other wit-
nesses, and defendant does not seriously dispute plain-
tiff's evidence. 
Counsel at page 12 of appellant's brief admits that 
there were more quarrels between these parties than one 
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would like to see in a marriage relation, but he attempts 
to excuse appellant's conduct because it is contended 
. that he had to live with his mother-in-law. It is respect-
fully submitted that the record will not support coun-
sel's contention. For instance, on July 2, a mere two 
weeks after the marriage, because respondent had gone 
to the cemetery with her neice, and was not home to greet 
appellant :vhen he returned unexpectedly from one of his 
out of to·wn trips, he became so angry that he left in a 
huff and registered at a Logan hotel and remained there 
two days. (R. 38, 39). Was the mother-in-law to blame 
for this incident~ She wasn't home at the time. 
And again on July 17, about one month after the 
marriage, at Salt Lake City, at home of respondent's 
daughter, the appellant like a "bolt out of the blue" 
came thundering into the home and called them a "bunch 
of liars." (R. 41). The appellant had left Logan a few 
days before on one of his trips, and when he called 
Logan and learned respondent had left for Salt Lake 
City, with l\1:rs. Rogers, he went into a rage and lost con-
trol of his temper when there was no occasion for such 
conduct on his part. ( R. 41-44). And again the query: 
Was his mother-in-law, in any manner, involved in this 
incident? She wasn't even present. On this occasion, 
and although they had only been married about a 
month, yet he threatened respondent with a divorce. 
(R. 43). 
The only deduction that may be made from appel-
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lant's conduct is that he wanted to reserve the right to 
come and go as he pleased, but he expected respondent 
to be home whenever he returned, or whenever he hap-
pened to call her on the telephone. 
The rule is well settled, even in equity cases, that the 
findings of the court, if supported by cornpetent evidenc(~ 
will be sustained by this court, and the rule is also well 
established that the ''appellant has the burden of show-
ing that the evidence preponderates against the findings 
assailed, on appeal, as not supported by the evidence.'' 
4 C. J. 777, Section 2727. Little v. Gorman 39 Utah 63, 
114 P. 321. 
Point IV-Condonation. 
It is contended on page 13 of appellant's brief that 
the parties cohabited together as man and wife on the 
return trip from California, which condoned improper 
acts, if any, of appellant which occurred before that time. 
This contention is not supported by the evidence. The 
respondent testified that she did not cohabit with appel-
lant after the last quarrel. (R. 56). The only reference 
made to this matter by appellant is found on pages 143 
and 144 of the record. But an examination of the record 
on those pages does not disclose any testimony by ap-
pellant that he cohabited with respondent after their last 
quarrel in California; and there is absolutely no evi-
dence of a reconciliation after the parties returned from 
their California trip. The appellant left immediately on 
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a deer hunt, (R. 152) and this action was commenced 
before he returned therefrom. 
The evidence does show that respondent condoned 
previous cruel acts committed by appellant, but there i~ 
no evidence in the record showing that she condoned the 
last quarrel in California, which resulted in appellant's 
decision to return to Logan and also respondent's de-
cision to institute divorse action against appellant. (R. 
52, 151). 
Respondent respectfully submits that the following 
rule is controlling here: 
"A repetition of the offense after condonation 
revives the original offense. Thus if a recon-
ciliation takes place after a separation because of 
cruelty, subsequent cruel conduct of the guilty 
party revives the former acts and permits a 
divorce upon the ground of all acts of cruelty, 
either before or after the reconciliation. A'n 
offense which has been condoned may be revived 
not only by a repetition of the same offense, but 
also by the subsequent commission of other mar-
ital offenses." 19 C. J. 88, Sections 204, 205. 
For the foregoing reasons respondent respectfully 
submits that the judgment and decree of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. E. NELSON, 
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